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Public-key encryption secure in the presence of randomness failures.

機譯：在出現(xiàn)隨機性故障時，公鑰加密是安全的。

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摘要

Public-key encryption (PKE) is a central tool for protecting the privacy of digital information. To achieve desirable strong notions of security like indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA), it is essential for an encryption algorithm to have access to a source of fresh, uniform random bits. Further, these bits should never be revealed and never reused. In practice, our machines typically generate these random bits with software random number generators (RNGs). Unfortunately, RNGs are prone to problems. The resulting randomness failures can have disastrous consequences for the security of existing PKE schemes that rely on good randomness.In this dissertation we focus PKE security in the presence of three types of randomness failures: predictable randomness, repeated randomness, and revealed randomness. For predictable randomness, where the encryption algorithm is given random inputs that are predictable to an adversary, we argue that we want PKE schemes that are hedged against bad randomness: if the encryption scheme is given good randomness it provably meets traditional notions like IND-CPA, while if it is given poor randomness, it still provably provides some security. We formalize this security notion and give provably-secure constructions of hedged public-key encryption.Next, we show how repeated randomness failures, where the encryption algorithm is given random inputs that it was given previously, can occur in practice due to virtual machine snapshots. In particular, we show how many popular web browsers are vulnerable to these failures. We then turn to building PKE schemes that still provide provable security when given repeated randomness. We develop new models of security to capture this situation and prove that a simple and efficient modification to any existing secure scheme gives security under our new models.Finally, we study the strange effects revealed randomness failures, where the random inputs used for encryption are later revealed to an adversary, can have on public-key encryption security. Specifically, we focus on selective opening attacks. We show that a large class of PKE schemes, called lossy encryption schemes, provably resists selective opening attacks.
機譯：公鑰加密（PKE）是保護數(shù)字信息隱私的重要工具。為了在選擇明文攻擊（IND-CPA）下獲得合乎需要的強安全性概念，如不可區(qū)分性（IND-CPA），對于加密算法來說，訪問新鮮統(tǒng)一的隨機比特源至關(guān)重要。此外，這些位永遠都不應(yīng)被泄露和重用。實際上，我們的機器通常使用軟件隨機數(shù)生成器（RNG）生成這些隨機位。不幸的是，RNG容易出現(xiàn)問題。由此產(chǎn)生的隨機性失敗可能對現(xiàn)有的依靠良好隨機性的PKE方案的安全性造成災(zāi)難性的后果。本文將PKE安全性集中在三種類型的隨機性失敗的存在上：可預(yù)測的隨機性，重復(fù)性隨機性和揭示的隨機性。對于可預(yù)測的隨機性，在加密算法被賦予了對手可預(yù)測的隨機輸入的情況下，我們認為我們希望對沖不良不良性的PKE方案：如果加密方案具有良好的隨機性，則可證明符合IND-CPA等傳統(tǒng)概念，盡管隨機性較差，但仍可證明提供了一定的安全性。我們將這種安全性概念形式化，并給出對沖的公鑰加密的可證明安全的結(jié)構(gòu)。接下來，我們將說明由于虛擬機快照而在實踐中如何發(fā)生重復(fù)隨機性失?。ㄔ谶@種情況下，加密算法被賦予了先前給出的隨機輸入） 。特別是，我們展示了有多少流行的Web瀏覽器容易受到這些故障的影響。然后，我們轉(zhuǎn)向構(gòu)建PKE方案，當重復(fù)出現(xiàn)隨機性時，該方案仍可提供可證明的安全性。我們開發(fā)了新的安全模型來捕獲這種情況，并證明對任何現(xiàn)有安全方案的簡單有效修改都可以在我們的新模型下提供安全性。最后，我們研究了揭示隨機性失敗的奇怪影響，其中用于加密的隨機輸入后來被向?qū)κ滞嘎?，可以具有對公鑰加密的安全性。具體來說，我們專注于選擇性開放攻擊。我們證明了一大類稱為有損加密方案的PKE方案可證明可抵抗選擇性的開放式攻擊。

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  • 作者

    Yilek, Scott Christopher.;

  • 作者單位

    University of California, San Diego.;

  • 授予單位 University of California, San Diego.;
  • 學(xué)科 Computer Science.
  • 學(xué)位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2010
  • 頁碼 122 p.
  • 總頁數(shù) 122
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文語種 eng
  • 中圖分類
  • 關(guān)鍵詞

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