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首頁(yè)> 外文學(xué)位 >A COMMON VALUE AUCTION MODEL ALLOWING ASYMMETRICALLY INFORMED BIDDERS, RISK AVERSE BIDDERS, AND A COMPARISON OF SEQUENTIAL VERSUS SIMULTANEOUS AUCTIONS FOR MULTIPLE OBJECTS (APPLIED GAME THEORY, INFORMATION ECONOMICS).
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A COMMON VALUE AUCTION MODEL ALLOWING ASYMMETRICALLY INFORMED BIDDERS, RISK AVERSE BIDDERS, AND A COMPARISON OF SEQUENTIAL VERSUS SIMULTANEOUS AUCTIONS FOR MULTIPLE OBJECTS (APPLIED GAME THEORY, INFORMATION ECONOMICS).

機(jī)譯：一個(gè)允許不對(duì)稱信息的投標(biāo)者，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡的投標(biāo)者以及多個(gè)對(duì)象的順序?qū)ν瑫r(shí)拍賣的比較的共值拍賣模型（應(yīng)用博弈論，信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)）。

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摘要

This dissertation studies auctions where all the bidders can realize the same value from the object being sold. Typically the object's value is unknown prior to the sale but each bidder has a private estimate of its value. This setting is termed the common value setting and might be the appropriate model for, say, the federal government's resource rights auctions. The model developed is informationally very simple--each bidder receives either a "high" or "low" signal, the likelihood of either being conditional on the true value of the object. The model's simplicity permits three extensions to the usual common value auction analysis.;First, asymmetrically informed bidders are permitted. Symmetric information does not mean all the players have identical information but rather that they all draw their private signals from the same distribution. Asymmetric information allows one player to simply have "better" information or a different form of signal. In this setting the players' equilibrium bidding strategies and the resulting seller's expected revenues are determined for various auction forms. These results are then contrasted with results from the symmetric model.;Second, risk aversion is introduced into the common value auction. It is shown that as bidders' risk aversion increases the second-price auction does progressively better for the seller than the first-price auction. Also, the all-pay auction, which performs well for the seller when the bidders are risk neutral, does poorly as risk aversion increases.;Third, it is possible to compare the seller's expected revenue from selling multiple objects through sequential versus simultaneous auctions. An important auction information release theorem says the seller can raise expected revenue by having a policy of publicly revealing all available information. In light of this result, it might appear that the seller would prefer to sell the objects sequentially with bid announcements since those announcements would likely be information release. However, the players, knowing this, may have an incentive to underbid to deceive their opponents. This deception effect may override the information release effect leading the seller to prefer simultaneous sales.
機(jī)譯：本文研究了拍賣，其中所有投標(biāo)人都可以從被出售的物品中實(shí)現(xiàn)相同的價(jià)值。通常，物品的價(jià)值在出售之前是未知的，但是每個(gè)投標(biāo)人都有其價(jià)值的私人估算。此設(shè)置稱為通用值設(shè)置，并且可能是例如聯(lián)邦政府的資源權(quán)利拍賣的合適模型。所開(kāi)發(fā)的模型在信息上非常簡(jiǎn)單-每個(gè)投標(biāo)人都會(huì)收到“高”或“低”信號(hào)，這兩種可能性均取決于對(duì)象的真實(shí)價(jià)值。該模型的簡(jiǎn)單性允許對(duì)通常的共同價(jià)值拍賣分析進(jìn)行三項(xiàng)擴(kuò)展。首先，允許非對(duì)稱信息的投標(biāo)人。對(duì)稱信息并不意味著所有參與者都具有相同的信息，而是他們都從同一分布中汲取了自己的私人信號(hào)。非對(duì)稱信息使一個(gè)玩家可以簡(jiǎn)單地獲得“更好”的信息或另一種信號(hào)形式。在這種情況下，針對(duì)各種拍賣形式確定參與者的均衡競(jìng)價(jià)策略和最終賣方的預(yù)期收入。然后，將這些結(jié)果與對(duì)稱模型的結(jié)果進(jìn)行對(duì)比。第二，將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避引入公共價(jià)值拍賣中。結(jié)果表明，隨著投標(biāo)人風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的增加，對(duì)賣方而言，第二價(jià)格拍賣確實(shí)比第一價(jià)格拍賣更好。同樣，當(dāng)競(jìng)標(biāo)者對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)保持中立時(shí)，全價(jià)拍賣對(duì)賣方表現(xiàn)良好，但是隨著風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的增加，全額拍賣表現(xiàn)不佳。第三，可以通過(guò)順序拍賣和同時(shí)拍賣來(lái)比較賣方通過(guò)出售多個(gè)物品而獲得的預(yù)期收益。一個(gè)重要的拍賣信息發(fā)布定理說(shuō)，賣方可以通過(guò)公開(kāi)披露所有可用信息的政策來(lái)提高預(yù)期收入。根據(jù)此結(jié)果，賣方似乎更愿意按順序發(fā)布標(biāo)書(shū)，因?yàn)檫@些標(biāo)書(shū)很可能是信息發(fā)布。但是，玩家知道這一點(diǎn)后，可能有動(dòng)機(jī)去阻止欺騙對(duì)手。這種欺騙效應(yīng)可能會(huì)超過(guò)信息發(fā)布效應(yīng)，從而導(dǎo)致賣方傾向于同時(shí)銷售。

著錄項(xiàng)

  • 作者

    HAUSCH, DONALD BRUCE.;

  • 作者單位

    Northwestern University.;

  • 授予單位 Northwestern University.;
  • 學(xué)科 Economic theory.
  • 學(xué)位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1985
  • 頁(yè)碼 151 p.
  • 總頁(yè)數(shù) 151
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文語(yǔ)種 eng
  • 中圖分類
  • 關(guān)鍵詞

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