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Pricing and financing roads in transportation networks.

機譯:運輸網(wǎng)絡(luò)中道路的定價和融資。

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摘要

Road pricing has two distinct objectives, to alleviate the congestion problem, and to generate revenue for transportation infrastructure financing. Accordingly, road pricing studies can be roughly classified into two branches with overlapping, one on congestion pricing and the other on toll roads. This thesis contributes to both branches of road pricing studies.;Congestion pricing with user heterogeneity in value of time (VOT) is studied. For a traffic network with user heterogeneity in VOT and fixed demand, there are two different objectives for network optimization, i.e. to minimize system time and to minimize system cost, which naturally gives rise to a bi-objective minimization problem. This thesis proves that any Pareto optimum of this bi-objective problem can be decentralized into multi-class user equilibrium by positive anonymous link tolls. The system performance gap when optimized by the two different criteria is quantified and a theoretical upper bound of the gap is established.;Congestion pricing proposals are frequently declined due to public opposition in the real world, and refunding the toll revenue to the users is a possible way to solve this problem. This thesis investigates Pareto-improving revenue refunding schemes which make every user better off compared with the situation without congestion pricing. Both the fixed demand and the elastic demand cases are studied. For the fixed demand case, a sufficient condition for the existence of Pareto-improving refunding schemes is established. For the elastic demand case, a Pareto-improving revenue refunding scheme is designed such that traffic equilibrium will not be changed. It is proved that, under some technical conditions, the Pareto-improving revenue refunding scheme would not use up the total toll revenue. In a general network, the revenue margin consists of two parts corresponding to the two effects of congestion pricing, i.e. demand depression and user rerouting.;Private provision of public roads through build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts is increasing around the world. This thesis studies optimal BOT contracts, which maximize social welfare and allow the private sector an acceptable profit, and investigates how to reach optimal BOT contracts either through bilateral negotiations or through competitive auctions. The study on private toll roads is then extended to heterogeneous users with different VOT. The distinctions between the private and the public sectors' choices on toll charge, road capacity and volume/capacity ratio are examined, which give policy implications on how to set proper government regulations when user heterogeneity in VOT is taken into consideration.
機譯:道路定價有兩個不同的目標,以緩解交通擁堵問題,并為運輸基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施融資創(chuàng)收。因此,道路定價研究可以粗略地分為兩個重疊的分支,一個是擁堵定價,另一個是收費公路。本文為道路定價研究的兩個分支做出了貢獻。研究了具有時間價值用戶異質(zhì)性(VOT)的擁堵定價。對于在VOT中具有用戶異質(zhì)性和固定需求的交通網(wǎng)絡(luò),有兩個不同的網(wǎng)絡(luò)優(yōu)化目標,即最小化系統(tǒng)時間和最小化系統(tǒng)成本,這自然會引起雙目標最小化問題。本論文證明,該雙目標問題的任何帕累托最優(yōu)都可以通過正的匿名鏈接通行費下放到多類用戶均衡中。量化通過兩個不同標準優(yōu)化的系統(tǒng)性能差距,并確定差距的理論上限。;由于現(xiàn)實世界中公眾的反對,擁堵定價建議經(jīng)常被拒絕,向用戶退還通行費收入是一項艱巨的任務。解決此問題的可能方法。本文研究了改進Pareto的收入退款方案,該方案使每個用戶的收入都比沒有擁堵定價的情況更好。研究了固定需求和彈性需求的情況。對于固定需求情況,為存在帕累托改進退款方案建立了充分條件。對于彈性需求情況,設(shè)計了一種帕累托改進收入退還方案,以使流量平衡不會改變。事實證明,在某些技術(shù)條件下,帕累托改進型收入返還計劃不會用盡總通行費收入。在一般網(wǎng)絡(luò)中,利潤率由兩部分組成,分別對應于擁擠定價的兩個影響,即需求下降和用戶重新路由。;在全球范圍內(nèi),通過建造-運營-轉(zhuǎn)讓(BOT)合同對公共道路的私人提供正在增加。本文研究了最佳BOT合同,該合同可最大化社會福利并允許私營部門獲得可接受的利潤,并研究如何通過雙邊談判或競爭性拍賣達成最佳BOT合同。然后,將私有收費公路的研究擴展到具有不同VOT的異構(gòu)用戶。研究了私營和公共部門在通行費,道路通行能力和容量/容量比的選擇上的區(qū)別,這在考慮到VOT用戶的異質(zhì)性時對如何制定適當?shù)恼ㄒ?guī)具有政策意義。

著錄項

  • 作者

    Guo, Xiaolei.;

  • 作者單位

    Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Hong Kong).;

  • 授予單位 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Hong Kong).;
  • 學科 Engineering Civil.;Transportation.
  • 學位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2008
  • 頁碼 191 p.
  • 總頁數(shù) 191
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文語種 eng
  • 中圖分類 建筑科學;綜合運輸;
  • 關(guān)鍵詞

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