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首頁(yè)> 外文期刊>Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers, IEEE Transactions on >Leakage Power Analysis Attacks: A Novel Class of Attacks to Nanometer Cryptographic Circuits
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Leakage Power Analysis Attacks: A Novel Class of Attacks to Nanometer Cryptographic Circuits

機(jī)譯：泄漏功率分析攻擊：對(duì)納米密碼電路的新型攻擊

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In this paper, a novel class of power analysis attacks to cryptographic circuits is presented. These attacks aim at recovering the secret key of a cryptographic core from measurements of its static (leakage) power. These attacks exploit the dependence of the leakage current of CMOS integrated circuits on their inputs (including the secret key of the cryptographic algorithm that they implement), as opposite to traditional power analysis attacks that are focused on the dynamic power. For this reason, this novel class of attacks is named ????????leakage power analysis???????? (LPA). Since the leakage power increases much faster than the dynamic power at each new technology generation, LPA attacks are a serious threat to the information security of cryptographic circuits in sub-100-nm technologies. For the first time in the literature, a well-defined procedure to perform LPA attacks that is based on a solid theoretical background is presented. Advantages and measurement issues are also analyzed in comparison with traditional power analysis attacks based on dynamic power measurements. Examples are provided for various circuits, and an experimental attack to a register is performed for the first time. An analytical model of the LPA attack result is also provided to better understand the effectiveness of this technique. The impact of technology scaling is explicitly addressed by means of a simple analytical model and Monte Carlo simulations. Simulations on a 65- and 90-nm technology and experimental results are presented to justify the assumptions and validate the leakage power models that are adopted.
機(jī)譯：在本文中，提出了一種新型的對(duì)密碼電路的功率分析攻擊。這些攻擊旨在通過(guò)測(cè)量其靜態(tài)（泄漏）功率來(lái)恢復(fù)加密核心的秘密密鑰。這些攻擊利用了CMOS集成電路的泄漏電流對(duì)其輸入（包括它們實(shí)現(xiàn)的加密算法的密鑰）的依賴性，這與專注于動(dòng)態(tài)功率的傳統(tǒng)功率分析攻擊相反。因此，這種新型的攻擊稱為“泄漏功率分析”。 （LPA）。由于每一代新技術(shù)的泄漏功率增加速度都比動(dòng)態(tài)功率大得多，因此LPA攻擊嚴(yán)重威脅了100納米以下技術(shù)中密碼電路的信息安全。在文獻(xiàn)中，首次提出了基于扎實(shí)的理論背景進(jìn)行LPA攻擊的定義明確的過(guò)程。與基于動(dòng)態(tài)功率測(cè)量的傳統(tǒng)功率分析攻擊相比，還分析了優(yōu)勢(shì)和測(cè)量問(wèn)題。提供了各種電路的示例，并且首次對(duì)寄存器進(jìn)行了實(shí)驗(yàn)性攻擊。還提供了LPA攻擊結(jié)果的分析模型，以更好地了解此技術(shù)的有效性。通過(guò)簡(jiǎn)單的分析模型和蒙特卡洛模擬，可以明確解決技術(shù)擴(kuò)展的影響。給出了在65納米和90納米技術(shù)上的仿真結(jié)果以及實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果，以證明這些假設(shè)合理并驗(yàn)證所采用的泄漏功率模型。

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