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The Economics of Film Distribution.

機(jī)譯：電影發(fā)行經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)。

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摘要

The film industry, namely Hollywood, is characterized by a pattern of large budget releases during what may be termed peak seasons. The peak seasons are centered on holidays, when demand is high, which in turn leads to greater box office revenue. This environment creates competition for release during these days and as such, distributors must compete in releases. This dissertation analyzes this behavior by incorporating game theoretic models to determine optimal release patterns. An economic history of the film industry and film distributors provides the foundation to current film practices. The economic history entails distributor practices through the various eras of Hollywood. A brief analysis of the major film distributors is also given. Chapter three introduces two-player noncooperative games. The first group of games centers on two players engaging in simultaneous play. From these games, a coordination failure arises and the second group games are specified under a correlated equilibrium. With correlated equilibria, it is possible to increase expected payoffs to distributors and increase social welfare. The game theory models are then tested with a series of regressions with data from 1998 -- 2008. Two measures of competition are proposed and found to decrease box office revenue. Policy regarding release schedules is presented in the conclusion.
機(jī)譯：電影業(yè)（即好萊塢）的特點(diǎn)是在旺季期間會(huì)大量發(fā)放預(yù)算。旺季集中在假期，因?yàn)樾枨笸ⅲ@反過(guò)來(lái)又增加了票房收入。在這種情況下，這種環(huán)境導(dǎo)致了發(fā)布方面的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，因此，發(fā)行商必須在發(fā)布方面進(jìn)行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。本文通過(guò)結(jié)合博弈論模型來(lái)確定最優(yōu)釋放模式，從而分析了這種行為。電影業(yè)和電影發(fā)行商的經(jīng)濟(jì)歷史為當(dāng)前電影實(shí)踐奠定了基礎(chǔ)。經(jīng)濟(jì)史涉及好萊塢各個(gè)時(shí)代的發(fā)行人實(shí)踐。還簡(jiǎn)要分析了主要的電影發(fā)行人。第三章介紹兩人非合作游戲。第一組游戲以?xún)擅瑫r(shí)進(jìn)行游戲的玩家為中心。從這些博弈中，出現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)失敗，并且在相關(guān)均衡下指定了第二組博弈。通過(guò)相關(guān)的均衡，可以增加對(duì)分銷(xiāo)商的預(yù)期收益并增加社會(huì)福利。然后用1998年至2008年的數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)一系列的回歸模型進(jìn)行博弈論模型的測(cè)試。提出了兩種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，發(fā)現(xiàn)它們降低了票房收入。結(jié)論中提供了有關(guān)發(fā)布時(shí)間表的政策。

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  • 作者

    Byrd, Williams Jennings.;

  • 作者單位

    Auburn University.;

  • 授予單位 Auburn University.;
  • 學(xué)科 Economics General.;Cinema.
  • 學(xué)位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2010
  • 頁(yè)碼 133 p.
  • 總頁(yè)數(shù) 133
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文語(yǔ)種 eng
  • 中圖分類(lèi)
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